The history of Australian foreign investment policy poses an explanatory challenge: why did a country long so open to overseas capital turn to more restrictive policy at the turn of the 1970s, only to significantly liberalise again from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s? Why has the regulatory apparatus of Australia's Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) been little changed over the last four decades, despite this latter significant liberalising policy shift? To address these questions some political economy issues inherent to FDI are first considered, and then the central role of foreign capital in Australia's historical development is discussed. The article subsequently explores the evolution of Australia's foreign investment regime and the confluence of economic.
Introduction
Investment from abroad historically has made a significant contribution to Australia's economic prosperity. From first European settlement the inflow of private overseas capital to Australia was unhindered by governments. Given the close historical ties with the United Kingdom there was little contention about reliance on British investment or loan capital during much of Australia's history
and an 'open door' policy complemented immigration as pillars of a longstanding national development strategy. Public investment generally complemented and attracted overseas private direct investment rather than supplanted it. Up until the Great Depression, governments often imported overseas capital on their own account when private flows were insufficient (Butlin, 1983: 83). However, large overseas borrowing and investment in infrastructure by the state governments during the 1920s, especially New South Wales, brought a severe debt servicing burden once the depression hit; turning a generation away from state developmentalism. Subsequently private overseas loans, especially from the Sterling area, and direct investments in particular, were welcomed as contributing to economic growth while sharing risks. Butlin judged the depression to ultimately mark the switch from public to private capital formation (1983:84) .
Although historically Australia has appeared as a relatively safe investment destination, foreign investor sentiment has been a recurrent theme in domestic debates about not only foreign investment policy but a range of other policy and tax settings that would impact on businesses.
Australia's first objective experience of an overseas financial markets backlash was in 1924 when British bankers imposed a loans embargo on the Queensland state government in response to its changing of conditions applying to pastoral leases (Cochrane, 1989) . During the depression in the early 1930s, bitter debate about whether indebted state governments should default on debt obligations or instead adopt severe austerity measures split the Australian Labor Party (ALP, or Labor) and left an attitudinal legacy of hostility to financiers in general and British ones in particular (Butlin, 1962) . While arguably this should instil a preference for the risk-sharing entailed in foreign direct investment (FDI) over foreign loan capital, the element of control entailed provoked antipathy.
Despite the perceived risks that foreign capital presented, it was not until 1972 that general controls on foreign takeovers were legislated for, although after a decade of building political pressures.
Restrictions and reviews were extended to new investments in other industries, including the increasingly important minerals and energy sectors in particular. For two decades natural resources were subjected to joint venture requirements, and some sectors, such as broadcasting, were subjected to even more restrictive policy, for longer. The mid-1980s and early 1990s brought significant liberalisation, but since then only piecemeal change has occurred to Australia's foreign investment framework. Moreover, the formal legal and administrative architecture of FDI regulation has remained largely untouched changed since the mid-1970s,; excepting some sectorspecific legislation.
The history of Australian foreign investment policy poses an explanatory challenge: why did a country that had been long so open to overseas capital turn to more restrictive policy at the turn of the 1970s, only to significantly liberalise again from the mid-1980s through early 1990s? Why has the regulatory apparatus of the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), and its legislative underpinnings, been little changed over the last four decades? In the process of exploring why, what insights also might be gained from the Australian experience into the politics and policy dynamics of FDI in general? To address these questions some political economy issues inherent to FDI are first considered, and then the central role of foreign capital in Australia's historical development is discussed. The article subsequently explores the evolution of Australia's foreign investment regime and the confluence of economic, attitudinal and political factors that shaped policy outcomes at key historical junctures, particularly in the period between the early 1970s to the early 1990s.
Complexity of FDI interests
FDI is complex in its intent. While an element of control is axiomatic, international business scholarship importantly distinguishes between market-seeking and production location advantageseeking FDI. Some investments have elements of both, perhaps with the strategic intent changing inter-temporally. It is inevitable that differing strategic intents has differing impacts in the host economy, and hence gives rise to a differing political economy as the structures of domestic interests vary.
FDI generally lifts the returns to factors of production that it utilises in the host countries, but with complex distributional consequences (Johnson, 1968; Makin, 1997 Makin, , 1998 . Although it may significantly increase the aggregate employment level, wages, or both, the element of control and new managerial practices may represent a threat to established work practices. Hence trade unions are often conflicted in relation to FDI. FDI should create more managerial career opportunities in aggregate but control events, such as a foreign acquisition of an existing enterprise, may see existing management teams displayed from organisations (Breton, 1964 (Dyster and Meredith, 1990:245) . FDI flows into manufacturing and services were drawn by this employment strength and added to it, as did the rapidly growing investment flows into the resources sector. Yet to many critics of FDI, economic nationalism now seemed affordable.
As criticism of FDI grew more popular in the late 1960s the Gorton government sought to act but not go as far as adopting general legislated controls. It resorted to an explicit policy of suasion;
encouraging foreign investors to seek local equity partners but not directly legislating for such requirements (SMH 17 September 1968; Aust 4 March 1969) . Strikingly, the government pressured the stock exchanges to remove listing rules prohibiting discrimination among holders of the same share class; making it possible for firms, should management wish, to change their articles of association so as to block non-resident shareholders from exercising voting rights (Aust, SMH 6
January 1969).
The first federal intervention to block a 'foreign takeover' was made by the Gorton government in Metallic minerals also saw some growth in the share of foreign ownership with a 10 per cent rise over a decade from the 39.8 per cent of 1963 (Anderson, 1983:76) . Overall, the level of foreign control was higher than ownership levels; reaching some 60 per cent of all the industry in 1974-75 compared to an ownership figure of 51.8 per cent. Voices critical of the ostensibly haphazard resources development, and of the relatively inefficient state royalties regimes, influenced a growing popular sentiment that Australia was not earning a sufficient return on its national resources (Fitzgerald, 1984:304-87) . Later, with the first oil shock and the petrodollar prosperity accruing to Arab oil-rich states in particular, this perception was reinforced.
In the earlier stages of development of the resources sector domestic mining interests were resolutely in favour of liberal FDI policy, owing to a need both for technological and managerial know how from abroad and because of the large capital requirements of projects. Later some established domestic and 'naturalised' foreign mining firms came to support local equity requirements as it effectively allowed them the first right of refusal for a stake in new projects, usually at a discount to what the cost of participation would have been in an open market for control. The first restrictions on foreign equity in mining were applied by the Gorton government to the emerging sensitive uranium industry and were strict; 5 per cent individual investor and a 15 per cent total foreign holding caps (AFR 18 September 1970; Arndt, 1977:137) .
A general FDI policy regulatory regime is born
With a booming economy in the early 1970s, and large foreign reserves, the political tide had Notably, the Companies (Foreign Take-overs) Act 1972 (Cth), explicitly a temporary piece of legislation that needed annual renewal, dealt only with control events, not new investments. It did not require pre-acquisition notification for screening, but did bestow on the government the power not only to block an acquisition but the undoing of one it did not mean: an undefined national interest test (Flint, 1985:14-53; Sexton and Adamovich, 1981) . This, it was argued, would lead to a high level of voluntary notification. Understandably the arbitrary exercise of review, only when a deal had somehow become politically salient, would disconcert business observers.
Importantly, the Companies (Foreign Take-overs) Act (Cth) created an administrative architecture that entailed an interdepartmental committee on foreign takeovers, but with core secretarial foundations in the Australian Treasury Department that was to advise the Treasurer on the exercise of powers created under the new Act, and which would provide the starting point for a regime still in place today. The Companies (Foreign Take-overs) Act (Cth) appealed to the management of manufacturing interests, who gained potential protection from takeover bids. It posed no threat to domestic mining interests who continued to favour a liberal regime as stakes in greenfield projects
were not subject to review. Whilst well received by a core Coalition constituency it did not go far enough to address the major headway that the ALP had made politically through an appeal to economic nationalism for the resources sector and beyond (Oakes and Solomon 1973:315 ). Yet
Labor's gain would also prove to be Labor's later pain.
The Whitlam government
As part of the famous 1972 'It's Time' campaign speech Whitlam declared 'the strongest and richest of our own industries have been bought up from overseas. It's time to stop the great takeover of Australia. But more important, it's time to start buying Australia back. A Labor government will enable Australia and ordinary Australians to take part in the ownership, development and use of Australian industries and resources'. (Whitlam, 1985:229) . The ALP's legacy in relation to FDI policy ultimately was to be an odd mix of administrative consolidation, economic reforms, and state developmentalist debacle. The acerbic personality of minerals and energy minister Rex Connor initially set the tone of the Whitlam government's resource nationalist crusade (Tsokhas 1984:66-9; Kelly 1976:155 ). An unorthodox endeavour to raise large petrodollar loans abroad through unusual channels-encapsulated in the Khemlani 'loans affair' that irrevocably damaged the reputation of the Whitlam Government-was aimed at replacing FDI in the resources sector with Australian public ownership (Kelly, 1976:155-77; Whitlam, 1979:45-53 The Fraser government's main innovations were in the establishment of the FIRB, and in the clarity of the accompanying policy guidelines that it issued, first through a substantial statement to
Parliament by Treasurer Phillip Lynch on 1 April 1976, and then in July with a rather comprehensive foreign investment policy explanatory guide. In the latter the government declared a 'conscious policy of non-discrimination as between different countries of origin'. FIRB was notable in that its membership was constituted by a small number of prominent non-government identities, although its role was solely to advise the Australia Treasurer on specific cases. The first chairman was a prominent businessman, explicitly appointed to give the FIRB 'distinctly free enterprise flavour', so it would provide 'an efficient, practical, and sympathetic link between the Government and foreign interests operating in Australia' (Lynch, FIRB, July 1976). FIRB was, like the previous interdepartmental committees, to be served by a Treasury secretariat.
In outlining its broad policy direction the Fraser government sought to clearly differentiate it from the economic nationalist experiment in the resources sector that had marked the first two years of the Whitlam government. While aiming to 'provide maximum opportunities for Australians to participate in the ownership and control of Australian industries and resources' the Fraser government declared it would 'avoid costly "buy backs" of foreign companies already established in Australia'. The AIDC and the Australian Resources Development Bank (ARDB) were still identified as having a financing role, the former being able to take equity stakes too but were to have predominantly market-conforming objectives.
Yet it was in the Fraser government's policy guidelines that the extent of near-bipartisanship on a somewhat restrictive FDI policy became starkly clear (Bell, 1976:44) . Established largely off-limits sectors-such as banking, broadcast media and aviation-were reaffirmed, with the explicit identification too of newspapers as also being so. This was despite the print media not being subject to sector-specific regulation. There were no minimum Australian equity guidelines set for nonresources sectors outside these areas. Yet FDI policy for the resources sector was notably restrictive-in some areas more so than the ALP had been. Only three years before the Coalition government had introduced the first foreign takeovers legislation to Parliament, and enunciated policy that had left the resources sector untouched. The Fraser government slightly moderated the ALP's 100 per cent Australian equity policy for uranium projects, but only by lowering it to 75 per cent (CT 2 April 1976). Other minerals and energy projects were subject to an expectation of 50 per cent local equity; although a proviso was stipulated that projects would not be held up in the absence of an interested Australian partner. Resources exploration was also not to be subject to Although the Fraser government's policy was relatively well specified and communicated, numerous definitional issues continued to arise. Most significantly, what actually constituted an Australian resident entity, and whether some firms that had had over a century of operational history in Australia, or even founded in Australia but with London-based shareholders, should be treated in the same way as newly arrived investors. Partly to address this the Fraser government subsequently developed 'naturalisation' provisions, primarily involving a negotiated schedule to achieve 51 per cent Australian equity (Treasurer, Press Release, 9 June 1978; Bryan 1989:2; Sexton and Adamovich 1983:134-35) . Also, by offering a path to 'naturalised' status the government could maintain its formal commitment to an 'equal partnership' policy for the resources sector while hindering fewer large projects (Bryan, 1983:72) . In doing so it inadvertently revealed how the domestic political economy of the resources sector had evolved rapidly, as a business constituency for restrictive policy mobilised. Several prominent enterprises and management personalities that Much of the popular appeal of restrictions on FDI in resources stemmed from perceptions that a full and fair return was not being captured by the Australian people at large from the natural resource endowments that by law were public property (Anderson, 1983:144-48) . Although the Fraser government did seriously canvas the possibility of introducing a federal resource rent tax, it ultimately shied away from doing so in the face of state and mining industry resistance, despite the efficiency advantages of such a tax being better understood (Garnaut & Clunies-Ross, 1979) . The latter Fraser government years proved to be the high point of restrictive FDI policy in Australia, which seemed rather at odds with the Coalition government's own free enterprise narrative. Yet it was consistent with its upholding of the status quo on tariff policy, continuing heavy regulation of capital markets and the maintenance of currency controls and fixed exchange rate (Glezer, 1982; Anderson and Garnaut, 1987; Pomfret, 1985) . Prime Minister Fraser's personal values were no doubt a factor, but so too was the optimism that came with a nascent resources boom; a misplaced faith shattered by recession in the early 1980s (Jolley, 1977:233) .
Unlikely Liberalisation: The Hawke government
The ALP came to office in March 1983 with a foreign investment policy more restrictive than that maintained by its Coalition predecessor. The ALP's national platform called for imposition of a 51 per cent local equity requirement across the board, and Labor was opposed to the one liberalising gesture that the Fraser government had undertaken just before the election: acceptance of a recommendation to issue licenses to operate in Australia to a limited number of foreign banks from the 1981 Campbell Inquiry into the financial system (Pauly, 1987 (Pauly, :27, 1988 . commitment to establish a national foreign investment register was dropped as cooperation from the states that was unlikely to be forthcoming. Some tightening of guidelines for property investments occurred, and a unionist was appointed to the FIRB, but overall the trajectory of both Treasurer
Keating personally and the Hawke government as a whole was one of revelling in plaudits won for unexpected liberalisation (Kelly, 1992:94) .
The initial impetus for this liberal policy and political orientation was the set of decisions to float the Australian dollar and remove capital controls in December 1983. Aside from the significant consequences for economic policy, it offered a potent lesson in the manner of decision-making. It did not require parliamentary or even Cabinet approval, and established a precedent of the government leadership taking decisions of major practical and symbolic import despite disquiet within ALP ranks (Bell, 1997:27) . Liberalisation of general FDI policy, which required nothing more than a press release from the Australian Treasurer, was to become a preferred means of taming market sentiment as the Australian economy was buffeted by the forces unleashed by the floating of the currency.
The ALP's first foreign investment liberalisation package came in October 1985 which lifted notification and review thresholds, dropped an 'opportunities test' that had given local businesses forewarning of a foreign firm's proposed investment or acquisition, but shied away from liberalisation of the property sector as various interests hankered after (Treasurer, Press Release no.136 29 October 1985) . A powerful impetus for further opening came with a precipitous decline in the Australian dollar in 1986. Treasurer Keating had earlier set the tone of national anxiety with a casual remark about Australia running the risk of becoming a 'banana republic' (Edwards 1996:295-96) . Over a weekend in late July the government formulated a package of economic reforms that had FDI liberalisation as its centrepiece; meant and received by financial markets as a signal of its commitment to maintaining open capital markets (AFR, Aust, SMH 29 July 1986).
The 1986 policy package substantially liberalised FDI in manufacturing, tourism, and in the nonbank financial sector. The 'economic benefits test' was suspended for both new investments and takeovers, local equity partners were no longer required and, although investments still had to be notified, 'proposals will be automatically approved unless they are judged to be contrary to the national interest' (Keating, Press Release 28 July 1986). However, the 50 per cent local equity guidelines for mining remained in place. The property sector was significantly opened up: local equity requirements for new projects were done away with and purchases of established commercial properties, previously prohibited, were permitted with a 50 per cent local equity partner or proof that one could not be found (Keating, Press Release 28 July 1986; FIRB 1994:46) . A concept was reiterated in which it was held that FDI in new projects would stimulate the creation of jobs (and later, in residential real estate, supply that would ease a rental squeeze), while acquisitions of existing assets were seen to bring less value. Keating explicitly said that the introduction of the capital gains tax regime had diminished concerns about foreign speculation (AFR 30 July 1986).
Although presented as a suspension rather than abolition of the existing requirements the July 1986 reforms were well received, and further affirmed the efficacy of liberalising FDI policy as a tool for winning plaudits for economic management. The ALP was to do this twice more; firstly with a package of reforms in April 1987, not long before calling an election that gave the ALP a historic third term in office. It abolished the 'economic benefits' test for sectors such as resource processing, insurance, stockbroking and rural sectors; leaving only a reserve veto on 'national interest' grounds (Keating, Press Release 30 April 1987; FIRB, 1988:31-33) . The net effect of such changes was that there was no onus upon the investor to demonstrate economic benefits to win approval, although if the government did happen to intervene on national interest grounds it was still not obligated to articulate its rationale.
The ALP's final major FDI liberalisation package was presented together with now Prime Minister
Keating's One Nation policy statement in February 1992. 2 In a final break with the Whitlam-era legacy, full foreign ownership of mining operations was to be allowed, subject only to the reserve veto power included in the national interest test (Dawkins, Treasurer's Press Release No. 25 26 February 1992) . Further banking licenses would also be issued to entities that met RBA prudential standards, and takeovers of domestic banks excepting the 'four majors' was to be permitted (FIRB 1993:48) . This four-pillar FDI policy for banking remains in place today.
Facing fears, late 1980s to early 1990s
Foreign investment policy under the ALP was not all a unidirectional process of liberalisation. In late September 1987 Treasurer Keating acted at odds with his liberalising credentials by announcing a new policy effectively making purchases of established residential real estate off limits to foreigners, unless they were temporarily resident in Australia for several designated purposes. In such cases any property bought by sojourning students or business people for personal use would have to be sold upon their departure (SMH 30 September 1987; FIRB 1988:14) . In 2015 seeming lax enforcement of these rules finally became politically contentious at a time of rising real estate prices and the Abbott Government moved to tighten them.
Some attributed Treasurer Keating's 1987 decision to introduce the rules to an ultimately ineffectual attempt to help the electoral prospects of the Labor government in New South Wales, at a time when purchases of Sydney real estate by foreigners were often being blamed as a factor in rapidly rising property prices. 3 Popular concerns were often entangled with rapid growth of FDI into real estate in absolute terms, as a share of total foreign investment, and with the emergence of Japan as the single largest source of investments (Edgington, 1990; Farrell, 1997; CEDA & Keizai Doyukai, 1990) . This came as national insecurities had been aroused with depreciation of the currency and the 'banana republic' shock. Japanese investment became quite controversial (Pokarier, 2004; Access Economics, 1991; Rix, 1991 Rix, , 1999 Goss 1989) . A Japanese proposal for a 'multi-function polis', a new high-tech designed city, attracted particular attention (Abe & Wheelwright, 1989; Inkster, 1991; James, 1990; McCormack, 1991; Mouer & Sugimoto, 1990 ).
resorted to a populist pitch against FDI that had been counterproductive given its established preference for an open door policy since at least 1984.
3 A poll for the Garnaut Report did reveal some 60 per cent of respondents said FDI in real estate should be 'discouraged or not encouraged' (Goot, 1990:261; Garnaut, 1989:97) . This contrasted starkly with a figure of 25 per cent for manufacturing, 17 per cent for tourism and 44 per cent for both the traditionally sensitive areas of mining and agriculture.
It is generally assumed in the international business literature that FDI aimed at exporting from a host country production base is much less likely to be face political resistance than investments directed at serving the host market (Encarnation and Vachani, 1985; Poynter, 1986:57 ). Yet Australia's experience suggests this is rather too simplistic. FDI in the export-oriented resources sector was generally more sensitive politically than domestically oriented investments in manufacturing. Even after Australia's pivot back to more liberal policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was considerable contention over foreign investments in the export-oriented tourism and agricultural sectors (Fisher, Stoekel & Borrell, 1998; Morison & Officer, 1992) . Both sectors were seen as having considerable export potential with growing Japanese market and fears were raised about vertical integration that would see most of the gains be captured by Japanese investors (Forsyth & Dwyer 1991 Queensland Treasury 1991a , 1991b . Some Australian exporter interests, such as in the beef industry, evidently sought to guard their locational advantages through supporting calls for restrictions on FDI by rival enterprises. However the Hawke and Keating governments generally approved primary industries proposals; perhaps politically easier as the industries were not the ALP's traditional constituency. This period offers parallels with later concerns about Chinese FDI.
The mass media, and broadcasting in particular, was the most notable sectoral exception to general FDI policy liberalisation during the 13 years of the ALP Hawke and Keating governments, and that illiberal status quo also persisted. A balance of contending private interests, and the sensitivity of the media, as seen in many other countries, to issues of foreign control and influence, diminished the incentives for policymakers to realise more liberal policy.
Limited sectoral exceptions aside, the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s was marked by a decisive public defence of the benefits of a liberal FDI policy by the government of the day, with considerable bipartisan political support. Although some National Party identities, being close to agricultural constituencies, adopted more critical positions on FDI in such sectors, the main oppositional leadership was at least as liberal as the Hawke and Keating governments. Media and academic commentary was also predominantly well-disposed to FDI, and the overtly hostile to populist appeals to anti-Japanese sentiment in particular. Openness to FDI had become generally associated with an acceptance not only of the need for Australia to reform its economy but also to embrace economic, cultural and political engagement with East Asia. (Garnaut, 1989) . The principle of non-discrimination based on country-of-origin, was articulated and defended specifically in response to the rising prominence of Japan as a source of FDI, and was frequented equated with a similar principle in immigration policy. It was only with a policy towards pursuing bilateral free trade agreements under the later Howard government, most notably with the US FTA, that the principle of non-discrimination by FDI origin was compromised.
It was in the late 1980s, as critics of Japanese FDI gained consideration attention, that the FIRB mechanism proved to be a valuable instrument for governments wishing to maintain a liberal policy in practice while placating community concerns about FDI. The FIRB was often presented as an effective safeguard mechanism by ALP government leaders (SM 5 June 1988; AFR 19 July 1988;  Her 16 August 1988; W. Aust 28-29 January 1989). It was a political formula for the pragmatic realisation of liberal FDI policy that has been the status quo for two decades since.
Conclusion
Public interest judgements about FDI will be patterned, consciously or otherwise, by the broader quality of a nation's economic governance, institutions, and market structures. In looking back over more than a half century of contention over the role of foreign investment in the Australian economy, it is clear that doubts about its value were more widespread while markets were heavily protected by tariffs, there was still no trade practices act or capital gains tax, or when state governments were perceived to be in a tournament for attracting mining investments with concessional royalties regimes and infrastructure assistance.
That is not to say that most people who feel instinctive doubts about an open FDI policy regime necessarily saw a more restrictive policy as a desirable 'second best' response to other needed economic reforms. On the contrary, as the The Australian's Ken Davidson commented as political pressure for a foreign takeovers law reached a crescendo, that: 'All too often the strongest economic nationalists in the Australian Parliament are also the advocates of policies designed to make foreign investors fat at the expense of the Australian community' (Aust 2 June 1972). Nationalism is an impulse. Economic nationalism is an impulse too, but often entangled also in ideological antipathy to free markets. The impulse to nationalism, as with any insider identity, typically manifests in reaction to the salience of an 'other', imagined or experienced. It may also mask the calculated pursuit of private interest through pubic policy interventions.
Australia's official discourse until the mid-1960s referred to 'overseas investment' rather than 'foreign investment', reflecting the predominance of British investment until that time and Australia's close historical ties with the United Kingdom. A shift in the composition of foreign investment away from sources that were long culturally and politically proximate to Australia brought new anxieties. In hindsight it was no surprise that Japanese investment caused some periodic unease given wartime memories, and the once lack of familiarity in Australia with Japanese enterprise. The late 1960s and 1970s was also a period characterised internationally by economic nationalist critiques of increasingly influential multinational enterprise.
Both the politics and the policymaking of FDI are fraught by informational constraints. By contrast, the impacts of changes in tariff regimes are relatively easy to measure, even to predict. The Australian experience revealed that while an investment screening regime may publish rejection rates the discouragement effect that they entail is difficult to quantify, as are the opportunity costs of legislated non-discretionary restrictions on FDI. On the other hand, the FIRB pre-approval regime for property development, for instance, tended to exaggerate the level of FDI as it captured approved investments rather than realised ones. Important too is the general lack of systematic attention paid to losses made by foreign investors, that may represent transfers of wealth from them to domestic interests through, for instance, over-paying for local assets or for outlays in the construction phase of a project that may prove uneconomical in time. In an information void, appeals to nationalism resonate more readily. Australian experience from the late 1980s, when the mass media gave much attention to critics of Japanese investment, showed that proactive responses by government leaders and business and economics commentators helped to diminish FDI as a political issue.
